Postmodern Parlor Games
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Gergen (October 2001) argued that postmodernism challenges both the science and the practice of psychology, while reassuring readers that this challenge is not "lethal" (p. 808). Like science, he suggested, postmodernism lacks a coherent and defensible foundation. Many of Gergen's criticisms have the ring of familiarity. Indeed, science itself has always been a self-critical and even self-devouring enterprise. Its view of knowledge as being preliminary, temporary, and concept dependent is humbling. This skeptical orientation stands in contrast with the religious dogmas that science displaced and with the anythinggoes approach postmodernists mistake as progress. characterization of scientific activity as a mere recording of reality is overly simplified. Scientific theories are admittedly incomplete models of reality, and empirical findings help evaluate any given model against its competitors (Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998) . Scientists learn from comparisons rather than from simply gazing into a microscope under the illusion of perceiving reality directly. In psychology furthermore, there is no generic sanctification of the individual mind and its presumed rationality. Studies of interdependence, group dynamics, and cultural differences are scientific staples, as are studies of rational and irrational mental processes and outcomes. Surely, the contribution of postmodernism cannot be a mere reminder that these things should be studied.
The postmodernist challenge is to deny scientific methods privileged status as ways of gaining knowledge. Again, this is not new. Arch anarchist Paul Feyerabend brilliantly argued this point in Against Method (Feyerabend, 1975 ) before any of the assorted deconstructionists, poststructuralists, or armchair pundits that threw into the fray. Feyerabend (1975) also made his point through a psychological rather than a rhetorical prism. Visual perception requires assumptions about what it is that might be seen. When different assumptions are made, the resulting perceptions are incommensurable, which means that they cannot be compared. Like a latter-day postmodernist, Feyerabend delighted in methodological diversity, pleading for inquiry unconstrained by convention. Where Feyerabend sought entertainment, Gergen sought advocacy. Feyerabend's championship of methodological diversity sought to turn psychology away from learning and toward group interests.
Without judging the legitimacy of any particular group interest, it is fair to say that the pragmatic benefits of research have long been considered important. Good theories are useful; even today's granting agencies demand that investigators predict the good that will come from their research. , however, worried either that scientific methods are unrelated to communal benefits or, worse, that they are counterproductive. If psychological science contributed to human misery, would a lethal blow not be the right thing? Why would one suggest that the historically frozen truth game abets the oppression of women or indigenous peoples and not advocate the wholesale abandonment of this game? Again, such a conclusion was not drawn because it would lack any foundation. Gergen suggested only that science should take a seat among the many varied efforts at storytelling.
Many scientific methods are distinguished by their ability to predict and thereby potentially control behavior. Predictive power is the hallmark of knowledge, because it provides a bridge from the known to the yetto-be-observed (Reichenbach, 1951) . If the power to predict entails the power to exploit, opposition to prediction would seem like the moral stance. Never mind that many good things (e.g., knowledge of how to live a healthy life) would also be lost, it is not even true that experiments necessarily increase the predictability of behavior. Asch (1956) and Milgram (1974) actually decreased predictability by bringing destructive situational forces to bear on their participants. When left to themselves, Asch's participants reported their perceptions truthfully, and Milgram's participants did not harm others. Behavior was perfectly predictable because there was no variability. In the experimental conditions, however, social influence prevailed on some but not all of the participants, and it was impossible to predict who would yield to this influence and who would not. Asch and Milgram taught how to learn from uncertainty.
Good science is rational in that it is future oriented. It seems to me that it is the postmodern rhetoric of sense making that is historically frozen. There are many ways to make sense, but what good is it when no predictions follow? alluded to the pursuit of cultural goals through qualitative research, but he did not explore how these goals may be reached by methods that limit themselves to making sense of what has already occurred (Dawes, 1991) . It would be a shame to demote science to just another narrative. Scientific psychology can serve the public interest. It shows, for example, how to improve decision making (Swets, Dawes, & Monahan, 2000) and how to identify fruitless professional practices (Lilienfeld, 
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Gergen's (October 2001) article provided a well-written and thoughtful discussion of postmodernism and its relationship to psychology. As described by Gergen, postmodernism evolved as a critique to some basic modernist assumptions, including the emphasis on the individual mind, objectivity, and language as carriers of truth. The postmodern view is that theories are not simply reflections of the world but a result of cultural construction, communal coordination, and language. According to Gergen, "the point of postmodern critique . . . is not to annihilate tradition but to give all traditions the right to participate within the unfolding of dialogues" (p. 808).
I do not disagree with the notion that culture, language, and subjectivity are important covariates in psychological science. However, I respectfully disagree with assessment of postmodernism's value for contemporary psychology and his recommendations for psychology's future as a science. In fact, I see very little value in adding this philosophical dimension to psychological thinking in an already compartmentalized discipline. I believe that this will be of little benefit and will lead to even more disunity (Erwin, 1992) , fragmentation (Staats, 1983) , stagnation (Erwin, 1992) , growth without progress (Ross, 1991) , and the further softening and trivializing of psychology as a science (Hofmann, 1999) .
The social and cultural contexts of psychological research and theories are certainly important variables that need to be considered when predicting, explaining, and modifying human behaviors. Nobody would disagree that psychology needs more studies on the contributions of culture, ethnicity, and gender to human behavior and thinking. However, culture, language, and communal rhetoric did not, for example, create Dolly, the first sheep cloned by European researchers through genetic engineering. She was a result of numerous well-controlled experiments leading to reliable and objective (yes, objective) findings.
In years to come, molecular biology will probably also find novel ways to modify human behaviors and prevent, or even cure, certain psychological disorders, such as schizophrenia. Again, cultural factors certainly play a role in the expression of this disorder. However, culture, social convention, and language do not create this problem. Genetic aberrations, an excess amount and/or a deficiency of certain neurotransmitters, and environmental and psychological stress are responsible for it. On the basis of this knowledge, medicine and clinical psychology have already made considerable advances in developing effective treatments for this disorder (postmodern therapies are not among those treatments, as far as I know).
I conclude that postmodern psychology implies a fundamentally antirealistic and nonempirical evaluation of psychological truth, which will be of little value for the advancement of psychology as a science. Psychology needs more objectivity, not less; it needs fewer theoretical and philosophical orientations, not more; and the science of psychology needs to become more exact and harder, not softer.
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Gergen (October 2001) has passionately advocated for enhancing postmodernism's role in psychology. In his article, he claimed that postmodernism has significantly impacted other social sciences, whereas psychology "has been slow to enter these debates" (p. 803). In contrast, I consider postmodernism's actual impact on other social sciences as being relatively minimal, whereas psychology has not unduly ignored postmodernism, a fact exemplified by the 32 relevant articles published since 1988 in the American Psychologist. In addition, many psychological subdisciplines (e.g., theoretical and humanistic psychology) have been very active in this debate. Where postmodernism's impact has been slight is in generating empirical research published in mainstream psychology journals. The theme of article is reconciliation. He argued that postmodernism can coexist amicably with psychological science-with the latter to be seen as merely one psychological perspective among many competing perspectives and to be neither privileged nor devalued. I have serious doubts, however, about the capacity to truly reconcile DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.57.6-7.462a DOI: 10.1037//0003-066X.57. 6-7.462b 
